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Weaknesses in Institutional Organization: 





While a general consensus exists that empowering the poor to take a proactive 
role in their development should be a c entral pillar of development efforts, it is not as 
clear that membership based organizations  are always the most effective means to 
improving the welfare of its members.   Several studies have documented case s in which 
collective organizations have failed to meet their  stated objective, at t imes even leaving 
members worse off (Gugerty a nd Kremer 2004, Morduch 1999, Rahman 1999).  Drawing 
from such experiences, a nascent  literature now studies how the vary act of creating a 
membership based organization can give rise to  incentives that work against the original 
intended goals of the organization (Gugerty and Kremer 2004, Stiles 2002, Howes 1997).   
This paper highlights this issue from the perspective of the smallholder coffee 
sub-sector in Kenya.  We hypothesize that the  marked deterioration of coffee 
cooperatives in Kenya c an be partly explained by institutional changes in cooperative 
organization that gave  full ownership and administrative control to members.  The rules 
by which cooperatives’ memberships elect their lead ers lend itself to capture by corrupt 
individuals whose rent-seeking predictably reduces members’ efficiency and welfare.   
 
2 COFFEE COO PERATIVES IN KENYA 
Small-scale production  dominates the Kenyan coffee sector with over 75 percent 
of land under production controlled by smallholder farmers
1.  The large fixed costs 
                                                   
1 Any  farmer with less than five acres of land under coff ee production is class ified as a smallholder grower.   2
involved in the processing and marketing of coffee, along with the additional hindrance 
of  inadequate transportat ion, communication, and banking infrastructure po ses significant 
challenges to smallholder profitability.   For this reason, the smallholder coffee sector has 
traditionally been organized into cooperatives in order to fac ilitate regulation and to 
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of  smallholder  coffee production, marketing and 
the provision of key inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, credit and extension services.    
  Since its introduction as a ca sh crop in the early 1900s, coffee has traditionally 
been the backbone of Kenya’s rural highlands economy.  Coffee was the nation’s top 
foreign exchange ea rner from independence  in 1963 until it was surpassed by tourism in 
1989.  Since then, na tional coffee earnings have steadily declined and currently rank 
fourth after tourism, tea, and horticulture  (Karanja, 2002).  
    Reacting to pressure from international donors in the late  eighties and early 
nineties, the government enacted a  series of reforms aimed at the eventual liberalization 
of the Kenyan economy.  As Kenya’s main foreign exchange earner, the coffee sector 
was a major target for reforms.  The policy change of particular interest to the  hypothesis 
advanced in the paper involves the new Cooperatives Act of 1998 which gave farmers 
complete autonomy over the a ctivities of the cooperative. Prior to 1998, the government 
played a major role in the running of cooperatives through the office of the  commissioner 
of cooperatives, and their field-agents lead by district cooperative officers (DCOs).   
Although members owned the cooperatives and elected the ir board members, the 
commissioner’s  office had powers to dissolve the governing board, call for fresh 
elections or directly appoint a care -taker committee.  DCOs were counted as extra-
official members of the governing board  and were mandatory signatories to all cheques 
and withdrawals made by the management.  The commissioner’s office was also the sole 
agent authorized to audit society accounts.    3
  Under the new policy, government no longer had any policy making jurisdiction 
over the economic activities of cooperatives and took on a minimal adv isory  role.  
Cooperative board  members were free to  conduct elections as they pleased, make hiring 
decisions of their choice, and contract , if they so wished, their auditor of choice. DCOs 
were no longer required to co -sign on any financial transactions.   These changes 
increased the incentives to rent -seeking by providing board members with unfettered 
access to cooperative coffers without the fear of persecution.    
  Thereafter, payments to growers plummeted amid growing political opportunism 
at the grassroots that damaged farmer morale and raised the level of corruption and 
mismanagement in cooperative a dministration.  Violence became common at annual 
general meetings (AGMs) called to elect board members.  Through the years, a general 
decline in AGM attendance ensued as growers began to be disillusioned by the process of 
elections.  Widespread belief has it that a  majority of those who continued to attend 
AGMs are bribed for a pittance.  Indeed several of the growers  surveyed under this study 
unabashedly acknowledged that they indeed had a ccepted bribes of Sh 100 (roughly, 
$1.40), or offerings of the local brew on election day to vote for the incumbents
2.  In this 
way, corrupt board members entrench themselves and embezzle the proceeds of coffee 
sales, further eroding the ailing cooperatives.  
 
3 ELECTION CAPTURE IN KENYA’S COFFEE COO PERATIVES 
 “Election capture”, describes the  process by which self-interested and corrupt 
candidates illegitimately manipulate  the electoral process in order to secure their victory. 
Along with the Cooperatives Act of 1998 that  increased the expected returns to rent -
                                                   
2 One respondent lamented his role as  “middleman”, accepting Ksh 1000 to run a candidate’s vo te buying 
program.  He regretfully rec ognized that he had helped elect a board  that had brought ruin to their 
cooperative.   4
seeking and decreased the risk of  detection and censure, certain features of the existing 
institutional environment contributed to facilitating election capture in Kenya’s Coffee 
Cooperatives. 
A.  Perfect Vote Signaling 
All of the nine coffee cooperatives surveyed  for this study conducted their elections 
in the traditional fashion of mlolongo.    Mlolongo, literally translated as “line-up”, 
describes the method of having voters  line up behind their preferred candidate with the 
candidate having the longest line winning the election.  Clearly, the con sequence of such 
a method is that everybody knows who everybody else voted for.  This facilitates vote -
buying by offering a free and perfect enforcement mechanism for candidates.  A voter 
who might otherwise simply accept the bribe and there after vote independent ly under a 
secret-ballot regime must now consider the cost of near -certain punishment should he 
deviate.  A secret ballot syst em for democratic majority-rules elections weakly dominates 
a perfect signaling mlolongo approach.  Mlolongo provides just the enforcement 
mechanism a rent-seeking candidate could use to advance  his objective, undermining 
grower productivity in the process . 
 
B.  Local Monopsony Power  
Kenyan law requires all coffee growers with less than five  acres of land under coffee 
to market their output solely through cooperatives.   Furthermore, due to poor 
transportation infrastructure and the need to pulp coffee cherry so on after it is picked in 
order to avoid quality-reducing fermentation, e ach cooperative has a legally defined 
catchment area.  Making it illegal for growers to sell their coffee to other potent ial buyers 
effectively grants cooperatives local monopsony  protection and shields them from 
potential competition.  The logic of organizing to attain an input -output mix at the bottom   5
of the long run average cost curve assumes a competitive market that requires collective 
cooperation  among small producers who intend t o be competitive.  Yet, protecting such 
organizations against competition discourages them from being efficient as there are no 
longer constraints that force them to maxim ize the benefits to cooperation. T he very 
motivation for organization, to attain optimal scale in the face of competition, loses its 
salience under monopsony.   In addition, local monopsony protection empowers rent -
seeking managers to exploit their growers by  forcing them to accept payments lower than 
the equilibrium price that would obtain  under a competitive market.  
 
4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1. Data 
The data were collected over a  four month period between No vember 2003 and 
February 2004.  Murang’a District of Kenya’s Central Province, was selected as the 
survey site.  It is a high potential  agricultural area on the eastern slopes of the Aberdare 
ranges endowed with good s oils and favorable rainfall.   In order to capture variation at 
the institutional level, our sampling method was stratified. We  first picked nine out of a 
total 19 coffee cooperatives in the District, purposively selecting the cooperatives so as t o 
achieve the greatest variation in spatial coverage of Murang’a, cooperative size, and 
subjective performance based on information from the District Cooperative Officer, the 
District  Agricultural Officer, and rec ent payments offered t o members for their output.  
Once the cooperatives were selected, we randomly picked a factory ( two for cooperatives 
with six or more factories ) and from that randomly selected our household sample , from 
the members’ registry.  We collected both cooperative level data and conducted farm 
level surveys. Table 1 presents some general statistics of the c ooperatives. 
 4.2. Empirical Strategy   6
Our goal is to test for the p resence of rent-seeking behavior in cooperatives and to 
show that, to the extent it exits, it has an inverse relationship to farm level technical 
efficiency.  Diminishing efficiency is a stricter  measure of the negative consequence of 
rent-seeking as it goes beyond merely asking if total output or  yields have decreased  - a 
trend that has already be shown to exist in the aggregate. A decline in output itself is not 
necessarily a signal of weak performance  and could simply reflect a rational shift in 
aggregate production patterns in response to chang es in the expected return s of available 
livelihood options.  As suc h, in our empirical investigation, we impose a more stringent 
condition, seeking to identify a statistically significant association between farm -level 
technical inefficiency and corruption  or mismanagement at the cooperative level.   
To tease this out from our data, we conduct three separate but interrelated te sts.  
First, we estimate a st ochastic production frontier for coffee yield and use the results to 
generate a farmer-specific measure of technical efficiency.  We then conduct two 
separate factor analyses to extract proxies that together provide an indication of the 
likelihood and extent that the  various cooperatives are involved with rent-seeking 
behavior.  The third test uses the effi ciency measures generated from the frontier 
estimation as the dependent  variable in an Ordinary  Least  Squared (OLS)  regression 
aimed at determining the sources of technical efficiency.  The rent-seeking proxies 
generated from the factor analyses are here u sed as independent variables in an effort to 
gauge the relationship between cooperative level rent -seeking and individual member 
technical efficiency.   We hypothesize a st atistically significant relationship between 
cooperative corruption and farm -level inefficiency. 
4.3. Estimating Farm-Level Technical Efficiency.   
To investigate patterns of farm-level technical efficiency, we estimate a stochastic 
coffee production  frontier then calculate each unit of observation’s deviation from this   7
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where  q is yield in kilos of coffee cherry per tree , z  denotes inputs,  v is the c ommon 
disturbance term which we assume to be normally distributed with me an zero, and u 
which has a non-negative  half-normal distribution and parameterizes the inefficiency 
error term.     
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the est imation.  
Estimation results are given in Table 3.    Results indicate that the total acreage of land 
available to the  grower, the acreage under coffee, the  amount of hired labor used in 
coffee production,  the age of the coffee trees, the use of  inorganic  fertilizers and the 
estimated pre-harvest loss were all significantly  related to the observed cherry coffee 
yield.   
Our principle objective in estimating the  production frontier was to  obtain  the 
estimates of grower technical ef ficiency within our sample. We included cooperative 
level dummies to control for heteroskedasticity in the inefficiency error term.  Estimates 
for eight of the nine cooperative dummies are statistically significant indicating that 
systematic differences in  farm-level technical efficiency  exits across  cooperatives.  As 
presented in Table 3, the estimates a re parameterized as the log variances of the error 
components. From these results, we can extract the farm -specific estimates of technical 
efficiency
3.  These estimates will later be used as the dependent variable for the test we 
run to look at the effect of corruption at  the cooperative level on farm specific efficiency.  
Table 4 presents some descriptive statistics on t he estimates of technical efficiency.  
                                                   
3 Values of technical effic iency range from zero to one, with one signifying optimal efficiency.    8
What immediately stands out from these statistics is the generally low levels of technical 
efficiency and the large variations that exist both within and between cooperatives.  
4.4. Creating Proxies for the Likelihood and Extent of Rent Seeking Behavior.  
The next step is to create proxies for the relative level of corruption and 
management incompetence b etween the cooperatives.  The idea is to identify and 
differentiate cooperat ives by the likelihood that they are run by rent-seeking and inept 
board members.  Our sample of only nine cooperatives with a total of thirteen factories  is 
too  limiting to  allow the use of regression analysis t o generate the req uisite proxies.  As 
such, we take a different approach,  seeking to identify corruption within cooperatives 
indirectly by studying the outc omes and perceptions that are c ommonly associated with 
corruption or mismanagement. 
 
Factor analysis, which is concerned  with uncovering the latent structure  of a set of 
variables, is well suited for our purposes .  We use factor analysis to reduce a set of 
variables into common factors that correspond to various aspects of   cooperative 
organization and practice that are likely to affect its productivity and are plausibly related 
to the degree of co rruption plaguing the cooperatives.  We conduct two separate tests, 
extracting two underlying factors from each.    
   
The first test includes only fact ory level variables and aims at generating common factors 
that speak to the structure and performance of the cooperatives.  Table 5 defines the 
variables used in the first test and provides some basic statistics.  Table  6 summarizes the 
factor analysis results.    The first factor, which we call size loads heavily on members, 
factories, and variance which are  all correlated with increasing size.  The low uniqueness 
posted by each of these variables indicates that t he underlying communality of size is   9
well  characterized by these variables.  Uniqueness is defined as that fraction of variance 
for the variable that is  not explained by the factors.  The second factor, which we call 
performance loads primarily on variables associated with the pe rformance or productivity 
of the cooperative as given by the payments its members receive, the volume of output 
they produce and the quality of their coffee.  Size  and  performance, as defined by the 
factors, increase with increasing factor values.    
Beyond  the structural features of a cooperative that  may determine the ease with 
which corruption takes root, or their relative performance that can proxy for the extent of 
mismanagement or rent-seeking activity, members beliefs regarding the effectiveness of 
cooperative management could also reveal some key information.  To investigate this 
possibility, we run a second factor an alysis on the variables defined in Table 7.  In order 
to facilitate interpretat ion of the subsequent factor loadings, we include the variables 
response structure. 
Table 8 summarizes the results of the second factor analysis.   The first factor, 
dissatisfaction, loads heavily on variables that  encompass subjective beliefs of how well 
the cooperative is managed.  While the uniqueness levels of  most of these variables are 
high,  the variables “effectivemanage”  and  “coopcompare”, which are closely related to 
our interpretation of the  underlying factor, are associated with accepta ble levels of 
uniqueness. As loaded, dissatisfaction increases as farmers are more likely to rate there 
cooperative as poorly managed, lacking in the provision of services, associated with 
violence and disengaged from the membership. As such, we would expect  dissatisfaction 
to be negatively related to farmer technical effic iency.    
  The second factor see ms to represent a measure of pe ssimism in the regulatory 
environment or a lack  of faith in the commitment of policy makers to improve 
cooperative performance. We call this factor  pessimism.  As a lack of confidence in the   10 
regulatory environment is likely to generate disincentives to productivity, we  expect a 
negative correlation between  pessimism and technical efficiency.  
4.5. Determinants of Farm-Specific Technical Inefficiency.  
The third test is an ordinary least squared (OLS) regression of the farm-specific 
estimates of technical inefficiency we previously constructed, on a set of likely 
covariates, including the rent -seeking factors, in an attempt to determine the sources of 
inefficiency.  Table 9 presents some descriptive  statistics of the variables used in the 
regression.  We control for the traditional household demographic variables in addition to 
experience (the  number of years the household has been growing coffee), the receipt of 
extension services, as well as the ratio of advance payment to total payment received by 
members.  The advance rat io is defined as the fraction of total payment that is received as 
an advance at the start of the season
4.  We include this variable as a proxy for liquidity. 
  For the four factors we use to proxy for corruption, the a ctual values do not mean 
much and are here simply normalized to mean zero.  However, because the variables are 
cardinally ranked, the  position of a given observation relative to the variable’s entire 
range is important.  Table 10 presents the results. 
  None of the demographic variables, including experience in coffee  growing, 
prove to be significantly related to degree of efficiency.  A possible explanation is that 
some of these variables are related to the use and ava ilability of inputs whose variation is 
already captured in the estimates of technical efficiency.   The  fraction of the total 
payment given as an advance at  the beginning of the season, a key policy variable, is 
significantly and positively related to  efficiency.  This points to  the crucial importance of 
providing smallholder farmers, who are oft en cash constrained and have limited access to 
                                                   
4 Recall that cooperatives pa y their members in two install ments.  A coffee advance payment (CAPS) at the 
beginning of the season, and a final  payment at the end of the season.    11 
credit, with some form of advance  payment on their output in order to facilitate the timely 
purchase of critical inputs such as inorganic fertilizers and pesticides.    
  The four rent-seeking variables, each of  which proxy different aspects of 
cooperative organization and performance that can be linked to the likelihood and extent 
of rent-seeking activity, are  all significantly associated with farm-level technical 
efficiency.  As hypothesized, size is negatively associated with tec hnical efficiency.  In 
our analytical model, we showed that the likelihood of election capture increased with 
increasing membership,  a variable clearly related to cooperative  size.  As such, this result 
could be interpreted as rev ealing a significant association between the probability that a 
cooperative has been captured by rent -seeking officials and technical efficiency.   High 
values of performance, associated as it is with higher payments to farmers and increases 
in the quality and quantity of output,  suggest a cooperative leadership that  seeks to 
maximize member welfare and pr ovide the right incentives for increased   productivity.  
As such, a positive and significant relationship between  performance and farmer 
efficiency also supports the hypothesis that rent -seeking at the cooperative level impacts 
negatively on farm level efficiency.    
  The negative and significant  result  on  pessimism lends further credence to our 
claims. Lack of confidence  in policy makers’ resolve to improve the rules and regulations 
that underlie the smallholder coffee sector suggests a current institutional arrangement 
that does not provide growers with incentives that aptly  reward productive behavior.   
  The only result unexpected  result regards the positive a nd significant relationship 
between  dissatisfaction and efficiency.  Because  dissatisfaction explained the least 
variation among the variables it loaded heavily on, it c ould be that our interpretation of 
the underlying communality explained in the factor  dissatisfaction is somewhat 
imprecise.  An alternative  explanation is that having controlled for cooperative   12 
performance,  dissatisfaction may be picking up farmer-specific expectations of how 
cooperatives could be managed, which, in turn, is associated with a farmer’s 
understanding of the disparity between the status -quo and what is possible under optimal 
management.  Such farmers, who are likely to be the most enterprisin g, would express 
the most discontent with management while still applying effort into their own 
production.    
 
5 CONCLUSION 
In this case study, we applied the principles of institutional economics to explai n 
the declining performance of coffee cooperative s in Kenya.  We showed that when the 
government ceased to regulate cooperatives in 1998, the lack of a credible enforcement 
mechanism opened t he way for corrupt and incompetent members to capture cooperative 
management positions for their personal benefit.   Sub-optimal electoral procedures that 
required members to publicly signal the candidate they support facilitated the proc ess of 
election capture by providing a costless enforcement mechanism for vote-buyers.    The 
exploitation of members by a self -serving board was further  exacerbated by a  legally 
supported local monopoly that force d members to market their coffee only through their 
cooperative, even though intermediary agents could offer them better terms.  As 
payments to members fall, they respond by cut ting back on output.  Cognizant of being 
ripped off, and with  no access to legal redress, their disenchantment with the state of 
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Kamacharia   18  4  3760  0.56  4.82  0.43 
Gaturi  48  5  3752  1.65  3.97  0.80 
Weithaga   20  4  2101  2.34  3.27  0.22 
Kanyenyaini   15  2  1249  2.71  7.68  0.18 
Kahuhia  50  6  3704  1.54  1.41  0 
Iyego   36  12  7000  2.46  5.27  6.35 
Kiru  19  4  2837  1.44  4.51  0.16 
Kangunu   21  1  1320  2.99  15.85  - 
Kiriti  20  3  2085  1.03  7.99  0.10 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statist ics for Frontier Estimation Variables 
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.   Min  Max 
Coffee Yield *  2.04  1.96  0.16  7.5 
Plot Area* (acres)   0.56  0.49  0.00  3.00 
Land Area * (acres)  1.84  1.77  0.20  13.00 
Household Labor * (Days)   44.84  38.06  0  120 
Hired Labor * (Days)   29.37  38.35  0  112 
Age of Coffee Tree *  30.88  11.13  2  50  
Pre Harvest Damage *  26.73  32.29  0  95  
Inorganic Fertilizer  (0=N, 1=Y)   0.234  0.424  0  1 
Organic Fertilizer (0=N, 1=Y)   0.447  0.498  0  1 
* Denotes variables  used in natural log fo rm in estimation.  For these variables, we 
followed the common practic e of substituting 0.001 for zero -valued observations to log -
transformations to be defined across the variables range.  Statistics presented for non -
transformed variable.   
 
 
                                                   
5 All pri ces quoted herein and through this section are  deflated to 1998 pric es 




Table 3: Stochastic Production Frontier Estim ates 
Parameter   Coefficient 
Std. 
Err. 





0.656  0.830  ) ln(
2
v s   ***  -1.853  0.236 
Plot Size  
** 
-0.256  0.103  ) ln(
2
u s        
Plot^2
  ***  -0.043  0.010  Kamachari a  ***  1.996  0.758 
Land Size  *  -0.138  0.079  Gaturi  ***  2.597  0.779 
Land^2
    -0.050  0.039  Weithaga    0.025  0.805 
House Labor     -0.003  0.024  Kanyenyaini  **  2.023  0.990 
House 
Labor^2
   
0.008  0.007  Kahuhia   ***  2.882  0.801 
Hired Labor   ***  0.112  0.020  Iyego  ***  2.067  0.803 
Hired 
Labor^2
  ***  0.028  0.005  Kiru  ***  3.199  0.799 
Tree Age   **  0.638  0.263  Kiriti  ***  2.870  0.802 
Tree Age^2
  **  -0.109  0.045  Constant   **  -1.998  0.795 
Harvest Loss   *  -0.135  0.071         
Harvest 
Loss^2
  ** 
-0.047  0.024 
 




0.658  0.112 
 




0.058  0.107 
 
     
               
Log Pseudo -
Likelihood  -28011.05  No. of 
Observations   207 
Wald chi2(14)   210.57  Prob > chi2   0.00 
*** - Significant at 99% level  
  **  - Significant at 95 % level     
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics  of Technical Efficiency Estimates 
  Mean  Std. Dev   Min  Max 
Kamacharia   0.50  0.19  0.18  0.78 
Gaturi  0.46  0.25  0.04  0.86 
Weithega  0.75  0.06  0.66  0.87 
Kanyenyaini  0.59  0.21  0.07  0.84 
Kahuhia   0.39  0.24  0.04  0.80 
Iyego  0.54  0.21  0.10  0.85 
Kiru  0.26  0.17  0.06  0.57 
Kangunu  0.76  0.08  0.64  0.88 
Kiriti  0.42  0.28  0.05  0.88 







Tables 5: Variables Used to Generate S ize and Performance Factors for 
Cooperatives 
Variable  Definition  Mean  Std. Dev  
payment   total factory level payment (Ksh per kg of output) 
made to members for 2002/2003 season   5.52  3.98 
members   number of active members per cooperative   3413  1738 
factories  number of factories operated by cooperative   5.31  3.12 
payvariance   coefficient of variation of intra -cooperative pay   0.31  0.4 
quality00  net value of coffee sales 2000 (kg per kilo)   81.69  28.85 
quality99  net value of coffee sales 1999 (kg per kilo)   76.68  8.03 
coopyield  average cooperative yield for 2002/2003 season (kg 



















Table 6: Results of  Cooperative Size  and Performance Factor Analysis. 
Variable  Size  Performance  Uniqueness  
members   0.98  -0.16  0.02 
factories  0.98  -0.09  0.03 
payvariance  0.88  0.14  0.21 
payment   -0.28  0.77  0.33 
quality00  -0.08  0.63  0.59 
quality99  0.30  0.40  0.75 
coopyield   0.09  0.66  0.55 
     
Variance in Variables Explained by Factors  
Factor   Proportion   Cumulative 
Performance  0.57  0.57 





















Table 7: Variables Used to Generate  Members’ Perception and 
Confidence Factors  
Variable  Definition  Response 
Structure 
goodrelations  members of the coop have generally good 
relationships with each other   1 
caninfluence  membership can influence decision making process   1 
profitdistribut e  membership unders tands how management 
distributes cooperative profits   1 
effectivemanage  management is effective in running the cooperative   1 
coopcompare  your cooperative is managed better than other coffee 
cooperatives in the region   1 
insecurity  this village/neighbourho od has a problem with 
insecurity and violence   1 
localgovt  local government officials can be trusted   1 
centralgov t  central government officials can be trusted   1 
agofficer   district agricultural officers do their best to  improve 
the welfare of farmers   1 
coopofficer  district co -operative officers do their best to improve 
the welfare of farmers   1 
creditaccess  do you have access to money lending facilities   2 
empowerment   are you able to make important decisions tha t could 
change the course of  your life   3 
     
Response Structure    
1 
1 = Strongly Agree; 2 = A gree ; 3 =  Neither; 4 = Disagree ; 5 = Strongly 
Disagree 
2  1 = Yes; 2 = No;    
3  1 = Totally Unable; 2 = Largely Unable; 3 = Neither ; 4 = Largely Able; 5 = 













Table 8: Factor Analsysis  of Members’ Perception and Confidence   
 
Variable  Dissatisfaction   Pessimism  Uniqueness  
goodrelations   0.23  0.04  0.95 
caninfluence   0.24  0.05  0.94 
profitdistribute  0.37  0.03  0.87 
effectivemanage   0.64  0.03  0.58 
coopcompare   0.61  0.00  0.62 
creditaccess   0.19  -0.06  0.96 
insecurity  -0.22  -0.06  0.95 
coopofficer   0.40  0.32  0.73 
agofficer  0.24  0.40  0.78 
localgovt  0.05  0.56  0.68 
centralgovt   -0.05  0.55  0.69 
empowerment   -0.06  0.23  0.94 
     
Variance in Variables Explained by Factors  
Factor   Proportion   Cumulative 
Dissatisfaction   0.60  0.60 





















Table 9: Descriptive Statistics  For Sources of Inefficiency Re gression 
Variable   Mean  Std. Dev.   Min  Max 
Gender  0.825  0.381  0  1 
Age  57.753  13.758  27  96  
Household Size   5.096  2.244  1  15  
Primary Education   0.332  0.472  0  1 
Secondary Education   0.328  0.470  0  1 
Post Secondary   0.057  0.232  0  1 
Experience  26.017  12.762  1  65  
Extension  0.320  0.467  0  1 
Advance Payment Ratio 2002   0.519  0.308  0.133  1.00 
Size  0.00  0.99  -1.16  2.28 
Performance  0.00  0.92  -1.35  1.77 
Dissatisfaction   0.00  0.81  -2.51  1.70 















Table 10: Sources of Inefficiency Estimates  
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Err  
Constant     0.308  0.286 
Gender     -0.018  0.049 
Age    0.003  0.010 
Age
2    0.000  0.000 
Household Size     0.001  0.008 
Primary Education     0.017  0.051 
Secondary Education     -0.027  0.057 
Post Secondary     -0.029  0.082 
Experience     -0.001  0.006 
Experience
2    0.000  0.000 
Extension    0.055  0.036 
Advance Payment Ratio 2002   **  0.196  0.086 
Size  **  -0.036  0.018 
Performance  ***  0.127  0.029 
Dissatisfaction   **  0.046  0.022 
Pessimism  **  -0.053  0.022 
R-Squared     0.1911   
Number of Observations     197   
*** - Significant at 99% le vel   
** - Significant at 95 % level   
* - Significant at 90 % level  
 